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Abstract: The importance of truncated distributions for bias in estimation
of regression coeﬃcients has been well understood by econometricians, but
the relevance of truncation when estimating policy reaction functions has
not been fully appreciated. Due to the emergence of low interest rates and
the proximity of a zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates, coeﬃcient
estimates can be biased upwards. This paper illustrates the importance
of measuring and correcting estimates for this bias using Japan’s unique
experience of prolonged low inﬂation/deﬂation. While we would expect the
monetary policy reaction function in Japan to diﬀer from other countries in
the G4, we show the bias from truncation of the interest rate distribution is
signiﬁcant and needs to be taken into account.
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11 Introduction
The importance of allowing for truncated distributions when estimating re-
gression coeﬃcients has been carefully researched by Goldberger (1981),
Greene (1981), Amemiya (1984) and Chung and Goldberger (1984). The
relevance of this literature has been widely understood in applications rang-
ing from demand for telephone services to labour supply decisions. But the
necessity of accounting for truncation needs to be reiterated for monetary
economists attempting to estimate policy rules during recent episodes - most
notably in Japan, the US and Switzerland - where rates of interest controlled
by policymakers have reached low and near zero values. The estimation of
monetary reaction functions using a dependent variable constrained by a
zero lower bound (ZLB) without suitable adjustment will result in upwardly
biased coeﬃcient estimates. This represents a case where the policymaker is
faced with regime change - very low interest rates in proximity to zero - that
alters the reaction function by constraining the further downward movement
of rates and putting a lower bound on rates (c.f. Adam et al., 2005 for an
example of changing parameters of reaction functions with regime change
when there is not a zero constraint). Our paper illustrates the extent of the
bias using Japanese data.
Japan is the ﬁrst country to have faced a lower bound on the nominal in-
terest rate in practice and we might expect to observe bias in the coeﬃcient
estimates where the inﬂuence of truncation is not taken into account. The
Japanese experience has attracted considerable interest in theory and policy
literatures (c.f. Fuhrer and Madigan 1997; Ahearne et al. 2002; Jinushi et
al. 2002; Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Ito and Mishkin, 2004; Kuttner
and Posen, 2005 among others). Clarida et al. (1998), Bernanke and Gertler
(1999), and Kuttner and Posen (2005) have uncovered much greater inﬂation
response coeﬃcients in monetary reaction functions for Japan, where the es-
timated response to inﬂation lie in the range 2.04 - 2.97, than estimated for
other industrialised countries. Although it is expected that monetary pol-
icy responses will diﬀer in Japan compared to the experiences of other G4
economies for institutional and economic reasons, the proximity of the inter-
e s tr a t et oaz e r ol o w e rb o u n di sar e l e v a n tc o n s i d e r a t i o ns i n c ei ti n t r o d u c e s
the possibility that these estimates are signiﬁcantly biased upwards as we
demonstrate here.
We make two points: we show by simulation that an estimator that
does not allow for the truncation will typically generate upwardly biased
coeﬃcients when the regression variables are non-normally distributed (as
is the case for our Japanese data), and we show that estimated coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcantly biased due to the truncation eﬀect of the ZLB. Our paper
measures and corrects the biased estimates of the monetary reaction function
to allow for the truncation of the dependent variable by using the Tobit
model for Japan. The coeﬃcient estimates in the literature of the response
2to inﬂation in Japan exceed estimates in other G4 countries, but where they
include a ZLB these are upwardly biased. We remind empirical monetary
economists that estimates for samples including a ZLB episode should take
truncation fully into account.
2 The Zero Lower Bound and Estimator Bias
A typically speciﬁed reaction function such as the modiﬁed Taylor rule is
written as follows;
rt =( 1− ρ)αIV +( 1− ρ)βIVπt+n +( 1− ρ)γIVe yt + ρrt−1 + εt (1)
where rt is the monthly call rate, πt+n is the monthly inﬂation rate at the
nth-period horizon, and e yt = yt − y∗
t is the output gap, with y∗
t derived as
potential output using an HP ﬁlter (c.f. Clarida et al. (1998))2.E s t i m a t e d
coeﬃcients are derived from instrumental variable methods to control for
endogeneity bias, βIV and γIV, are the marginal responses to inﬂation and
the output gap. These can be estimated with and without smoothing (where
1 >ρ> 0,o rρ =0respectively) although estimates of βIV and γIV are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in each case.
Estimation of (1) using Japanese data by Clarida et al. (1998), Bernanke
and Gertler (1999), and Kuttner and Posen (2005) among others has un-
covered that the inﬂation responsiveness coeﬃcient βIV is generally larger
than estimates for other G4 countries. Although this is not always due to
the ZLB, since some authors estimate reactions prior to the ZLB episode,
authors such as Kohn (1996), Orphanides and Wieland (1999) and Yates
(2003) have argued that a higher response to inﬂation is rational for any
central bank facing nominal interest rates that approach the region of the
ZLB. The proximity to the ZLB makes policymakers more responsive to
inﬂation because the forward-looking policymaker properly recognizes the
costs of implementing policy under the zero bound and takes precaution-
ary measures to reduce the probability of deﬂation before rates reach zero.
While there may be good reasons to think that the Bank of Japan would
react more strongly than other central banks to inﬂation as the operational
rate approaches zero, we can demonstrate that ignoring the truncation of
2We follow the literature in using a Taylor rule. In using the Taylor rule we are able
to compare our results with others reported in the literature, but in doing so we do
not imply that the Bank of Japan was, or should have been, following a Taylor rule for
policy making purposes during our sample. Policy by the Bank of Japan has undergone
signiﬁcant changes during the sample, not least when facing the approach of the ZLB, and
this has created an apparent break in the volatility of interest rates. We are not primarily
interested in the economic interpretation of the coeﬃcients but the issue of potential bias
in estimation in the reaction function. The change in volatility of interest rates might
potentially aﬀect our measure of bias but we investigate this matter later in the paper
and estimates of the bias are unaﬀected.
3the dependent variable through the impact of the ZLB results in upwardly
biased estimates of the coeﬃcient on inﬂation in equation (1). This might
give a misleading impression of the extent of the reaction when close to the
ZLB.
2.1 Estimator Bias
We denote by r∗
t the desired interest rate from the monetary reaction func-
tion. In the presence of a ZLB constraint the nominal interest rate cannot
fall below zero but if the desired rate falls below zero the observed interest
rate rt will exceed the desired interest rate r∗
t, and will be censored at zero:
r∗
t = α∗ + β∗πt+n + γ∗e yt + εt (2)





In the above Tobit model, the interpretation of the inﬂation rate coeﬃcient
β∗ measures how much the desired interest rate r∗
t (not the observed interest
rate rt) increases with a unit increase in the future inﬂation rate. The
marginal eﬀect (denoted by β∗
a)o fi n ﬂation rate on the observed interest
rate rt is given by
β∗
a =
∂E(rt | πt+n, e yt)
∂πt+n
= β∗ × Pr(r∗
t > 0), (3)
which is the primary object of interest in most cases as well as in our paper.
Hence, the adjusted coeﬃcient β∗
a must be smaller than the unadjusted
estimate of the coeﬃcient β∗. The more observations are censored, the
smaller the adjusted coeﬃcient becomes.
One can consider a situation in which a researcher that fails to take
account of the truncation may erroneously run the following regression in
order to estimate βIV,t h em a r g i n a le ﬀect of πt+n on the observed interest
rate rt;
rt = αIV + βIVπt+n + γIVe yt + εt. (4)
The above regression (4) is obviously misspeciﬁed and the size of the bias
in the inﬂation response coeﬃcient βIV will depend on how much it will
deviate from the correct marginal eﬀect β∗
a (i.e. the bias term is deﬁned as
βIV −β∗
a). Hence, by examining the relationship between βIV in (4) and β∗
a
in (3) we can determine the extent of the bias.
Under multinormal distributional assumptions Green (1981) and Gold-
berger (1981) proved that
βIV = β∗ × Pr(r∗
t > 0), (5)
which implies that βIV = β∗
a. This result is interesting because it shows that
even though the Taylor rule regression in (4) is misspeciﬁed, it can actually
4provide the correct marginal eﬀect of πt+n on the observed interest rate rt
under the multi-normality condition. However, this interesting result holds
only if r∗
t,πt, and e yt are multinormally distributed, and this condition does
not hold in our Japanese data set. Figures 2(a)-2(c) show the histograms
and Jarque-Bera test results for rt,πt and e yt respectively, demonstrating
that the normality condition is emphatically rejected for rt and πt. Similar
rejections of the normality condition can be shown for countries facing near
zero lower bounds e.g. the US and Switzerland.
Chung and Goldberger (1984) generalised the result in (5) under con-
siderably weaker distributional assumptions. They showed even without
normality that
βIV = β∗ × (σr∗r/σ2
r∗) (6)
where σr∗r = cov(r∗
t,r t) and σ2
r∗ = var(r∗
t).3 The relationship between βIV
and β∗







t >0). Therefore, the direction and the relative size of the bias
term (βIV −β∗
a) is determined by the multiplier δ; an upward bias will result
for δ>1 and an downward bias for δ<1. In the next section, we access
by simulation the size of the multiplier δ using a data generating processes
similar to our Japanese data.
2.2 Monte Carlo Simulation
The extent of the bias can be veriﬁed by conducting several Monte Carlo
simulations. First, we check the validity of δ =1in the normal case using
the following data generating process:
r∗
t =0 .9+2 .2πt+n +0 .1e yt + εt (7)






where πt =0 .95πt−1 + ηt, ηt ∼ N(0,1), e yt ∼ N(0,1) and εt ∼ 0.1N(0,1).
T h ev a l u e sf o rt h ec o e ﬃcients α,β and γ are obtained from preliminary
estimation using the Japanese data and we set T =2 9 7 ,t h en u m b e ro f
observations in our data set. The results based on 10,000 replications are
reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 1. As predicted by the theory, we ﬁnd
δ =1and hence there is no bias in the IV estimator: βIV = β∗
a. Therefore,
even though misspeciﬁed, the regression using rt as the dependent variable
provides the correct marginal eﬀect.
3It can be shown that under normality σr∗r/σ
2
r∗ =P r ( r
∗
t > 0) so that (6) specialises
to (5).
5Second, we move onto the non-normal case. For this we replace πt+n
in the data generating process in (7) with the actual inﬂation rate and e yt
with the actual output gap series in our Japanese data set. The results are
reported in the second column of Table 1. The marginal eﬀect βIV from the
now misspeciﬁed regression is 2.09 while the corrected marginal eﬀect β∗
a is
1.83. T h i si sb e c a u s eσr∗r/σ2
r∗ is greater than Pr(r∗
t > 0),m a k i n gδ>1.
Hence, the result indicates that the conventionally obtained marginal eﬀect
of future inﬂation rate on the nominal interest rate may have been over-
estimated because the truncation issue has not been properly addressed
and the estimator is upwardly-biased. In the next section we estimate the
relationship using a Tobit estimator that corrects for the truncation of the
dependent variable.
3D a t a a n d R e s u l t s
To estimate the central bank reaction function we use a sample of monthly
data from 1979/04 till 2003/12, giving 297 observations. The starting date
corresponds to the point where the interbank lending rate became the chief
operating instrument of monetary policy in Japan and all capital controls
were ﬁnally abandoned. The operating rate is the overnight call rate, while
the inﬂation rate is the annualized change in the Consumer Price Index and
monthly output gap are constructed using the Industrial Production Index
detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. The time series plot of
the overnight call rate is given in Figure 1 where it is easily seen that the
interest rate fell below 0.5% in 1995 and further decreased to near zero values
in 1999 as part of a zero interest rate policy4.
Following Kuttner and Posen (2005), we use n =1 2and ﬁrst two lags of
inﬂation rate and output gap as instruments as the base line case, but we
check the robustness of our results by using a longer horizon, n =1 8 ,a n da
larger instrument set including the ﬁrst six lags of inﬂation rate and output
gap. The results are reported in Table 2. The results indicate estimates
o ft h er e s p o n s et oi n ﬂation, β, are positive with a coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly
greater than Taylor’s suggested value of 1.5 in all but one case. The mag-
nitude of the coeﬃcient varies with the horizon, but it is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent when the instrument set is altered. The response to the output gap
is not signiﬁcant for any speciﬁcation in line with earlier results reported by
4The Bank of Japan introduced the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) in April 1999.
This involved a decision to lower the interest rate in the current period to zero, but also to
commit to a zero interest rate so long as deﬂation continued to exist. The Bank of Japan
also implemented a policy of quantitative easing whereby it ﬂooded the ﬁnancial markets
with liquidity as part of its policy to deal with deﬂation. These policies are consistent with
equation (2) provided that the response to inﬂation (deﬂation) dominates the response to
the output gap i.e. β
∗ >γ
∗ since a deﬂation would generate a negative desired interest
rate, which would restricted the actual rate to zero.
6Clarida et al. (1998), Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Kuttner and Posen
(2005). These estimates provide the baseline IV estimates against which we
can compare the corrected estimates (β∗
a and γ∗
a) allowing for truncation of
the dependent variable.
To correct for the truncation of the distribution in the lower tail we adjust
for the probability that the interest rate falls below some threshold value.
The reason to use a threshold value is that interestingly in the Japanese
case, the observed interest rate was never actually equal to zero even under
the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP). The lower bound was near zero but
not equal to zero; the rate was very low at 0.5 or less from 1995. Therefore,
we investigate the fact that Japan eﬀectively experienced zero lower bound
(ZLB) by treating the nominal interest rate as eﬀectively zero lower bounded
if it is below a certain threshold value c which is near zero, considering
four values for c =0 .001,0.01,0.1 and 0.5. Although the interest rate is not
actually constrained by zero in any of these cases the proximity of the bound
is such that the central bank would have been aware that it had little room
for further policy loosening, and the eﬀective point at which the bound was
inﬂuential may well have occurred at 0.5 rather than 0.001. In Table 3, we
compute the relative frequency (proportion of sample) where the nominal
interest rate is smaller than c, and since the proportion increases with the
distance of c from zero we expect the extent of the recorded bias to increase
with c. These probabilities are used to scale the Tobit estimators to give
adjusted coeﬃcients that allow for the truncation of the distribution of the
nominal interest rate.
The Tobit estimation results are given in Table 4 for both large and small
instrument sets. After adjustment for the probability that the interest rate
falls below the threshold value the adjusted coeﬃcients (β∗
a and γ∗
a)g i v e
the corrected response to inﬂation and output gaps allowing for truncation
of the distribution. The results in Table 4 demonstrate that the usual IV
estimates (βIV and γIV as in Table 2) reported in much of the literature are
generally biased upwards. For example, considering h =1 2and the small
IV set case, the usual IV estimate βIV is 2.14 while the Tobit-corrected
estimate β∗
a is in the range of 1.65-1.89, depending on diﬀerent values of c.
When either a longer forward horizon is used (h =1 8 )o ral a r g e rI Vs e ti s
used, the results are qualitatively the same; i.e. there is a sizable bias in the
conventionally reported IV estimates.
It is expected that for a larger value of c, more observations are censored
and the correcting factor, Pr(rt ≤ c) becomes larger, implying that the
size of the bias becomes greater and this expectation is conﬁrmed in Table
4; the bias increases with the value of c. The 0.5 threshold has a larger
adjustment (because Pr(rt ≤ c) is larger), resulting in a signiﬁcantly smaller
adjusted coeﬃcient than for other threshold values at the same horizon.
The adjustment necessarily brings the coeﬃcients closer to Taylor’s original
coeﬃcient value, but they are still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1.50, which
7suggests that the response to inﬂation is signiﬁcantly stronger in Japan than
elsewhere as previous authors have discovered in episodes prior to the ZLB.
Importantly however, there is signiﬁcant bias in the unadjusted estimates
due to the impact of the ZLB, meaning that the degree to which policy
rates adjust to inﬂation is not as great as has been commonly reported in
the recent literature. The coeﬃcients on the output gap by contrast are
small and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, except where the threshold is set
to the value of 0.5, the bias here is smaller and typically not signiﬁcant.
There may be good reasons to be sceptical about whether a Taylor rule
accurately captures policymaking in Japan. The commitment to maintain a
zero interest rate so long as deﬂation exists and a shift towards quantitative
easing under the ZIRP cast some doubt on whether a Taylor rule is an
appropriate speciﬁcation for Japanese monetary policy in our sample5.A l s o ,
there appears to have been a marked reduction in volatility of interest rates
w i t h i nt h es a m p l ep e r i o d( s e eF i g u r e1 ) 6. However, our main point - that the
ZLB can bias estimates because the interest rate distribution is truncated - is
illustrated clearly by our results notwithstanding these qualiﬁcations to the
economic interpretation of the Taylor rule. The point generalises to many
other cases such as the United States and Switzerland where interest rates
were very low and distributions were non-normal; here policies were pursued
that were moreconsistent with a Taylor rule and estimated coeﬃcients from
policy reaction functions could be potentially biased by truncation in those
cases also.
5Adam et al. (2005) oﬀer a narrative approach that deals with discrete changes in
regime by estimating reaction functions for sub-samples of data (in their case the UK).
This is a useful exercsie provided a clear break in policy can be identiﬁed and the sub-
samples for regimes are suﬃciently long. Here we have a break in regime in April 1999
which gives only 56 observations to estimate the reaction function under the ZIRP, but
for most of the period there is no variation in the interest rate (it is essentially zero as the
ZIRP implies).
There are other economic objections to Taylor rules. A signiﬁcant contribution by
Kuttner and Posen (2005) argues that the unreliability of output gap data for Japan
causes doubts about the validity of Taylor rule estimates irrespective of regime change
and Kim, Osborn and Sensier (2005) and Kesriyeli, Osborn and Sensier (2006) highlight
the potential for nonlinearities in policy reaction functions, although their analysis is not
directly applied to the case of Japan.
6We model the impact on the bias correction multiplier, δ,a l l o w i n gf o rab r e a ki n







2[t>τ T ] where τ can take various values to indicate a break in instability at




2 =0 .1 and after 10,000 replications
we ﬁn dt h eb i a si su n a ﬀected by breaks represented by diﬀerent values of τ.R e s u l t s
available on request.
84C o n c l u s i o n
Japan’s unique experience of prolonged low inﬂation, deﬂation and the real-
ity of a zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate would lead us
to expect estimates of the monetary reaction function to diﬀer from those in
other countries in the G4. Estimates by Clarida et al. (1998), Bernanke and
Gertler (1999), and Kuttner and Posen (2005) conﬁrm that the response to
inﬂation was much stronger than other countries. Most recent studies ﬁnd
similar coeﬃcient estimates but ignore the important eﬀect of truncation on
estimated coeﬃcients due to the ZLB. Our paper shows that ignoring the
lower bound on interest rates biases the estimates upwards, but correcting
estimates to allow for the truncation of the interest rate distribution gives
lower responses albeit estimates of the response to inﬂation that are still sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from the value of 1.50 suggested by Taylor (1993). These
results are nolt biased however, and give a true picture of the response to
inﬂation under low and near zero interest rates.
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